Monetary Policy under Imperfect Commitment : Reconciling Theory with Evidence by Hakan Kara
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Monetary Policy under Imperfect 
Commitment: Reconciling Theory
with Evidence
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ! ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿   ￿￿￿"
December 2004
Hakan KARAMonetary Pol i cy under Imp erf ect Commi t ment :
Re conc i l i ng The ory wi t h Evi de nc e∗
A. Ha ka n K a r a †
December 2004
Abstract
In the standard forward looking models of the recent literature, theoretical opti-
mal monetary policy rules imply much higher inertia of interest rates than estimated
historical policy rules. Motivated by the observation that theoretical policy rules of-
ten assume perfect commitment on the part of the monetary authority, this study
formulates the monetary policy behavior with a continuum from discretion to full
commitment, and using this setup seeks to match the theory with evidence. It is
shown that, optimal instrument rules under imperfect commitment exhibit less iner-
tia on the policy instrument; the degree of inertia declining as the policy moves from
full commitment to discretion. Therefore, under the assumption that the monetary
authorities operate somewhere in between discretion and commitment, historically
observed policy behavior can be reconciled with the optimal policy rules–even in a
purely forward looking framework. As a by-product, we propose a method to measure
the stance of monetary policy from the perspective of discretion versus commitment.
To test our proposal, we estimate a structural monetary policy rule for the Federal
Reserve Bank, which nests discretion and commitment as special cases. Empirical
results suggest that recent practice of monetary policy has been closer to commitment
than the policy pursued in the 70’s.
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In the standard forward looking models of the recent literature, theoretical opti-
mal monetary policy rules under commitment imply much higher inertia of interest
rates than estimated historical policy rules. For example, Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1998), and Giannoni and Woodford (2003) derive optimal policy rules under
commitment using standard baseline forward looking models. These authors e.g.,
emphasize that theoretical optimal rules involve not only intrinsic inertia in the dy-
namics of the funds rate, but also are actually “super inertial”, i.e., the implied
dynamics involves a root larger than 1, resulting an explosive path. However, as
is also emphasized in these and many other studies, estimated historical rules typi-
cally do not have this property. On the other hand, optimal rules computed under
discretion in forward looking models are far less inertial – if not inertial at all –
than the estimated rules. This observation suggests that a policy rule somewhere
in between commitment and discretion may reconcile the observed degree of inertia
with the theoretically implied ones in forward looking models.
This paper, then, attempts to match recommendations of the theoretical models
with actual estimates of the historical rule, by incorporating some degree of imper-
fection to typical full commitment solutions. We introduce the notion of “imperfect
commitment” to emphasize that the policy maker acts in a state between discretion
and commitment. Accordingly, we construct a continuous metric for the stance of
monetary policy from a discretion versus commitment standpoint, in which full dis-
cretion and full commitment correspond to 1 and 0, respectively, while imperfect
commitment is in between. Using this metric, we seek to answer how much discre-
tion (or equivalently how much commitment) must be introduced into the standard
baseline model, so that the degree of inertia implied by theoretically optimal policy
rule matches the historical one.
Recently, there have been a number of attempts to match the theoretical rules
with the estimated rules. However, these studies consider backward looking models,
where discretionary solution is exactly the same as the solution under commitment–
incorporating no intrinsic inertia in the behavior of the policy maker other than that
is embedded in the structural law of motions. Moreover, these studies either motivate
an ad hoc interest rate smoothing objective as e.g., in Sack and Wieland (2000), or
1introduce uncertainty as e.g., in Rudebush (2001) to obtain more inertial theoretical
rules. Therefore, the problem they need to address is how to obtain more history
dependence in theoretical rules–exactly the opposite of what we have in this study.
We argue that, deviations of the actual monetary policy rule from the full com-
mitment rule can be decomposed into two main sources: ﬁrst, commitments are
imperfect, because they do not last forever. One interpretation may be that, due to
publicly known factors such as reappointments of the central bank administrations,
large aggregate shocks, or institutional environment, policy maker reoptimizes with
a ﬁxed probability that is common knowledge. Hence, in such a case, central bank’s
overall credibility of ability is not perfect, but it is stable and perfectly known. Sec-
ond, commitments are imperfect because the central bank lacks some credibility of
intention, in the sense that private agents in general expect the commitment to last
shorter than that is intended by the central bank.
We show that, under imperfect commitment, observed behavior of the instru-
ment of the central bank will be related to past values of the instrument itself and
other target variables in a less inertial way, rendering the implied theoretical pol-
icy behavior closer to the estimated ones. In fact, within the setting, by choosing
the “appropriate” degree of commitment, any degree of interest rate inertia can be
obtained from the central bank’s optimization problem.
On the other hand, our theoretical approach to represent instrument rules un-
der imperfect commitment suggests a method to construct a performance measure
of the policy pursued by the central banks. For once the dynamic ineﬃciency is
parametrized and incorporated into the policy rule, it can be identiﬁed directly by
estimating the structural instrument rule. This provides a stance of monetary pol-
icy on the ground of proximity to full commitment behavior. If one regards the
full commitment with perfect credibility as the ideal policy making, then it can be
argued that, the more the policy behavior deviates from it, the less eﬃcient is the
policy rule.
Accordingly, we specify an instrument rule embedding the assumptions just men-
tioned, and estimate the theoretically constructed commitment parameter for the
terms of three Fed Governors. Empirical ﬁndings suggest that, monetary policy
during Volcker and Greenspan tenures were conducted with a similar degree of com-
mitment. Moreover, provided that the policy makers had a similar model in their
2mind, post 1980 (Volcker-Greenspan) policy was closer to commitment than the
policy followed during 1970’s (Burns-Miller).
The model does not involve time inconsistency in the sense of Barro and Gordon
(1983) since the objective of the policy maker involves target variables that are con-
sistent with the steady state. However, as shown by Woodford (1999) and Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler (1999) there is still inconsistency resulting from forward looking
behavior of the agents – namely “dynamic time inconsistency” or stabilization bias,
as called by Svensson (1997). In such an environment, credible commitment to a
policy rule can improve the constraints faced by the policymaker, delivering a more
eﬃcient output-inﬂation frontier. In that sense, the measure we derive for the stance
of monetary policy can be interpreted as a measure of dynamic eﬃciency, where the
most eﬃcient policy corresponds to full commitment under perfect credibility, and
the least eﬃcient is the period by period optimization.
While estimating the policy preferences directly from the policy rule is common
in recent studies,1 to our knowledge, there is no reported attempt in the literature
to quantify a measure of dynamic eﬃciency (or proximity to a commitment regime)
of the monetary policy by directly estimating a structural policy rule. In that sense,
we believe, our approach is novel.
To illustrate the main theme, next section summarizes the instrument rule (or
the policy reaction function) derived by Giannoni and Woodford (2003). Third
section derives an imperfect commitment version of the rule and discusses in what
conditions it can match theory with evidence. Fourth section carries out a structural
empirical exercise to estimate the stance of monetary policy during diﬀerent periods
by using the metric introduced in the previous section, leaving the ﬁfth section to
conclude.
2 A Standard Optimal Interest Rate Rule
Giannoni and Woodford (2003) derive an instrument rule that is in the same form as
estimated Taylor-wise rules. Using a similar setup explained below, these authors’
proposed policy rule consistent with the optimal state contingent plan takes the
1See Favero and Rovelli (2002), and Özlale (2002) for example.
3form
it =( 1− ρ1 + ρ2)i
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and σ,β,κ,λx,λ i are structural parameters and policy preference parameters to be
explained below.2 One can use the calibrated values of structural parameters to
contrast the theoretical rule under full commitment with the empirical ones. Using
the values estimated by Judd and Rudebush (1998) for the period 1987-1996 of
Greenspan’s term , and the parameters calibrated in Woodford (2003), for example,
Giannoni and Woodford (2003) obtain
ρ1 ρ2 φπ φx
estimated 1.16 .43 .42 .30
theoretical 2.16 1.01 .64 .33
.
Note that in the empirical reaction function, φx represents the coeﬃcient on the level,
rather than the change in the output gap. This is because estimated historical rule
shows no reaction to past output gaps for the Greenspan period.3 It is clear that, in
parametric terms, the theoretical rule, which is derived under inﬁnitely lasting and
perfectly credible commitment, explains qualitatively, how forward looking models
can deliver the interest rate inertia that is observed in empirical reaction functions.
Moreover, the signs of the reaction parameters are consistent with the historical
evidence.
Nevertheless, the table reveals an important quantitative distinction. Estimated
rules (like all other estimated rules in recent studies) exhibit much less inertia on the
part of the instrument than the theoretical rule would suggest: as explained above,
micro foundations for the theoretical model imply that σ>0,κ>0 and 0 <β<1,4
2When the policy is time dependent, initial conditions of x1 = i0 = i1 =0has to be added to
(1).
3It involves a signiﬁcant reaction to diﬀerence of the output gap for the Volcker period though.
4See Woodford (2002) chapter 4.
4and thus ρ1 and ρ2 has to satisfy conditions (2a), implying super-inertial behavior
of the instrument regardless of any speciﬁc calibration of the model.5 Therefore, not
only the two rules look diﬀerent in terms of magnitudes of the reaction coeﬃcients,
but indeed, there are no feasible parameter values reconciling the super-inertial
behavior of theoretical rule with the historical ones!
3 Optimal Instrument Rule under Imperfect Com-
mitment
In this section, we introduce a generalized version of the instrument rule (1). Our
purpose is twofold: First we wish to explore the implications of relaxing the as-
sumption of full commitment (or perfect credibility) to allow for partial degree of
discretion, and to see if this can be helpful in matching empirically observed rules
with the theoretical ones. Second, we want to prepare grounds for deriving a method
to measure the dynamic eﬃciency of the Fed policy by direct structural estimation
of the instrument rule, and conducting an assessment of past US monetary policy
on this ground.
3.1 The model
The structural model and the objective of the central bank is identical to Giannoni
and Woodford (2003) except that we assume the central bank targets a positive rate
of inﬂation.6 The baseline model is a standard forward looking model consisting
of an IS curve and an AS curve which have increasingly became the workhorse of
contemporary monetary policy analysis.7
The model consists of two structural equations that are derived from optimizing
behavior of private sector: an aggregate supply equation derived from the ﬁrst order
condition for optimal price setting by the representative supplier and an IS curve
5This can be seen by writing the instrument rule as it =( 1− ρ1 + ρ2)i∗ +( ρ1 − ρ2)it−1 −
ρ2∆it−1 + φππt + φx∆xt and observing that ρ1 − ρ2 =1+ κ
σβ > 1,a n dρ2 = β
−1 > 0.
6This assumption only aﬀects the constant term in the theoretical instrument rule.
7See for example, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), Woodford (1999a, 1999b, 2002) among
others.
5derived from an Euler equation for the optimal timing of purchases. The New-
Keynesian aggregate-supply equation (AS) takes the form
πt= κxt+βEtπt+1 + ut (3)
where πt is the period t inﬂation rate deﬁned as the percent change in the price
level from t − 1 to t, xt is the output gap which is deﬁned as the percentage by
which output exceeds its potential, 0 <β<1 is a discount factor, κ is a positive
coeﬃcient and ut is an exogenous disturbance term. We use the notation Etπt+1
to denote private sector expectations regarding of t+1conditional on information
available in period t. Equation (3) relates inﬂation to output gap in the spirit
of a traditional Phillips curve. In contrast to traditional Phillips curve, current
inﬂation depends on the expected future course of the economy, and thus on the
expectations of future monetary policy, because ﬁrms set prices based on expected
marginal costs. The parameter κ can be interpreted as a measure of the speed of the
price adjustment. Output gap xt captures the marginal costs associated with excess
demand. This speciﬁcation allows for a shock ut, which shifts the distance between
the potential output and the level of output that would be consistent with zero
inﬂation. These shifts are not considered to represent variation in potential output,
a n dt h u sa p p e a ra sar e s i d u a li n( 4 ) .W ew i l ln a m eut simply as the ”supply shock”.
Within the framework, monetary policy aﬀects real economy, because sellers cannot
change their price every period.
The aggregate demand (IS) equation takes the form
xt = −σ
−1 [it − Etπt+1 − r
n
t ]+Etxt+1 (4)
where it is the central bank’s instrument which is a short term nominal interest
rate, σ is a positive coeﬃcient (the intertemporal elasticity of substitution), and
rn
t is the natural rate of interest. Deviations of output from the potential output
depends upon real interest rate, expected future output gap and the natural rate of
interest. These structural equations can be derived as log-linear approximations to
equilibrium conditions of a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which the
inﬁnitely lived representative household maximizes its lifetime utility. For analytical
tractability of the solution, exogenous disturbances ut and rn
t are assumed to be i.i.d.
6and E(rn
t − ¯ r)=E(ut)=0 . The two structural equations (1) and (2) together with
a policy rule determine the equilibrium evolution of endogenous variables πt, xt and
it.
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where π∗,x ∗ and i∗ are target values for inﬂation, output gap, and interest rate
respectively. Although their theoretical value can be derived from the quadratic
approximation of the representative agent’s utility function, we will assume that the
parameters λx and λi can be treated as policy maker’s preferences, and the analysis
in this study goes through any objective function that can be represented in the form
as (5), whether it represents theoretical welfare or not. It is important to note here
that unlike many empirical studies that attempt to match the inertial nature of the
empirical reactions functions with the theoretical ones,8 the objective (5) does not
contain an ad hoc interest rate smoothing. Introducing interest rate targeting into
objective function, on the other hand, is justiﬁed in Woodford (2004). Accordingly,
the only source of inertia in this study will stem from the optimal inertia that the
monetary authority follows due to forward looking behavior.
The problem of the policy maker is to choose a policy rule to implement the
equilibrium processes which minimize (5) subject to (3) and (4). There are two
main approaches in the literature to solve this problem: under full comitment (the
assumption of inﬁnitely lasting commitment with perfect credibility), central bank
optimizes once and for all, and announces a state contingent policy rule that will be
implemented forever. Under the discretionary approach, central bank re-optimizes
each period.
3.2 Formulating Imperfect Commitment
A convenient way to introduce an intermediate behavior between discretion and full
commitment is to divert from the two main assumptions underlying commonly used
8See forexample, Rudebush (2001) or Sack and Wieland (2000) among others. These authors use
purely backward looking model of the economy hence, in their framework, dynamic inconsistency
does not exist. Therefore, imperfect commitment behavior is irrelevant to these studies.
7full commitment setup in the literature. The ﬁrst assumption is that commitment
lasts forever. Following Roberds (1987) and Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2001), we
generalize this condition by assuming an exogenous process that generates stochastic
reformulation of the commitment, thereby creating ﬁnite lasting commitments on
average. On the other hand, second crucial assumption in full commitment models is
that central bank has perfect credibility of intentions. That is, private sector expects
the future course of monetary policy to be in line with central bank’s true intentions.
We relax this assumption and introduce imperfect credibility of intentions into the
model by allowing the private sector’s expected regime duration to diﬀer from the
policymaker’s intended average duration of a commitment.
3.2.1 Finite Commitment Regime
Suppose there is an exogenous stochastic signal realized at the beginning of each
period which takes the values “optimize” with probability αo and “do not optimize”
with probability (1 −αo), i.e., the central bank reformulates the policy with proba-
bility αo each period. In this case, average duration of a commitment regime turns
out to be 1
αo, hence, the commitment will be ﬁnite for nonzero values of αo.I na n
environment where αo is common knowledge, we will say the commitment regime is
imperfect but the central bank has perfect credibility of intentions, since the private
agents’ expectations about the future course of credibility match exactly those of
the policy maker’s. Therefore, the private agents take the probability of a reopti-
mization correctly into account and the policymaker is aware of the fact that she
may have to reformulate the policy with probability αo. After each reoptimization,
the central bank commits to a rule which is optimal as of the most recent period.
The new commitment is also expected to end with probability αo, and so on...
3.2.2 Imperfect Credibility of Intentions
Now, assume that the central bank still expects to reoptimize with probability
αo, however private sector thinks the regime will, on average, last shorter than 1
αo.
Namely, the private agents expect the central bank to reformulate the policy with a
probability αo + µ where a nonzero µ represents the imperfect credibility of inten-
8tions.9
We will assume that µ is exogenously given and cannot be changed by the central
bank in the short run. Given αo, the higher is µ, the less credible is the central bank.
When µ =1−αo, private agents expect the central bank to reoptimize every single
period, reﬂecting complete lack of credibility. If µ =0the monetary authority has
fully credible intentions, since private sector expects the regime to last on average
1
αo periods, as intended by the policymaker.
The central bank, on the other hand, knows that she is not perfectly credible, and
takes this into account while computing the optimal rule. Consequently, the policy
is conducted in such a way that incorporates these two imperfections impeding
the commitment behavior. Solving optimal monetary policy problem subject to
these two assumptions will yield a policy rule that nests discretion and commitment
as special cases. The case of αo = µ =0 , for example, will correspond to full
commitment under perfect credibility, while αo > 0 and µ>0 represents imperfect
commitment under imperfect credibility.10
To summarize, 1−(αo +µ) stands for the overall proximity to full commitment
behavior. In this set up, commitment is imperfect because of two reasons: αo
represents the ﬁnite nature of the commitment, while µ represents the imperfect
credibility of intentions. In what follows, we will use a composite index to denote the
overall imperfection in the policy (or equivalently the degree of dynamic ineﬃciency),
simply as αo +µ = α, which also denotes the private agents’ subjective belief of the
probability of a reoptimization.
9This can happen e.g., when there is a sudden shift to a longer commitment regime, due to
natural or administrative factors, which may not be perceived by the private agents immediately.
10Note that there are many credibility deﬁnitions in the literature. For example, Miller (1997)
decomposes credibility in two terms: credibility of ability, and credibility of intentions. From that
perspective αo can be used to quantify credibility of ability and µ can be used for credibility of
intention and consequently, 1 − αo − µ stands for the overall credibility of the central bank.
93.3 Central Bank’s Problem under Imperfect Commitment











2 + λx(xt − x
∗)
2 + λi(it − i
∗)
2
+ϕ1,t+1(πt − κxt − βEtπt+1 − ut)+ϕ2,t+1(xt + σ
−1 [it − Etπt+1 − r
n
t ] − Etxt+1)
i)
. (6)
In an environment where commitments end stochastically and the central bank has
only partial credibility, the problem is not trivial. The key question here is whether
the peculiar nature of the policymaker’s and the private sector’s expectations can
be incorporated into the conventional Lagrangian form or it will be more convenient
to use a Bellman-type setting. As will be seen below, the answer turns out to be
both.
Following Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2001), it will be useful to decompose
the private sector expectations into intra-regime and inter-regime components. For
example, one period ahead expectations of the private sector can be written as
Et[zt+1]=αEt[zt+1|inter regime]+( 1− α)Et[zt+1|intra regime], (7)
where inter-regime means conditional on a regime change (i.e., period t and t +1
belong to diﬀerent regimes), and intra-regime means the current regime goes through
next period (i.e., periods t and t +1belong to the same regime), and zt stands for
any endogenous forward looking variable at time t..
Note that, due to quasi-discretionary nature of the policy formulation, the prob-
lem is circular. In order to compute the optimal rule and the equilibrium processes,
one has to solve for the expectations; on the other hand, in order to solve for expecta-
tions one has to determine the optimal equilibrium. Fortunately, this problem can be
solved analytically by exploiting the purely forward-looking nature of the structural
model, and with the help of a plausible guess. The main idea is to represent private
sector expectations with intra-regime terms only (i.e., steering away the overlapping
expectations problem), so that all the choice variables in the optimization problem
belong to the same commitment regime.
10In order to understand fully the monetary authority’s problem, it will be helpful
to note the recursive nature of the problem at a glance. Let ∆τ be the (random)
duration of the regime which started at time 0. Then, minimum achievable value of
(5) can be expressed recursively as









2 + λx(xt − x
∗)







subject to (3) and (4).
where Vt is deﬁned as a value function associated with the central banker’s optimal
loss at time t. This term appears because the central bank is assumed to take into
account not only the losses accrued during her own regime but also the losses of
all subsequent regimes. The latter is summarized by a terminal payoﬀ Vt+∆τ in the
objective function.
Central bank’s loss function involves a random running cost function (the ﬁrst
term on the right hand side). When the commitment term ends unexpectedly, say,
at t + ∆τ, her successor faces exactly the same type of problem. The recursive
formulation implies that the solution to (8) will be optimal for the successive central
bankers as well.
We will be looking for a solution in which the endogenous variables will be linear
functions of the state of the economy. To break in the recursive nature of the
problem, one can exploit the linear structure by proposing an “educated guess” of
the state variables and the solution form.
Claim 1 Optimum equilibrium processes for the endogenous variables at time t can
be expressed as a linear combination of the Lagrange multipliers ϕ1,t,ϕ 2,t, and the
exogenous processes ut,r n
t .
Veriﬁcation
Using the claim, one can obtain a simple characterization of the one period ahead
private sector expectations by noting that




11where ˆ z denotes the deviation of a variable z from the steady state and ˆ rn
t+1 = rn
t+1−¯ r.
The second equality in (9) is obtained by noting that Lagrange multipliers will be
zero at the period of policy reformulation, reﬂecting the notion that the central bank
is not bound by any past promises. Thus (7) can be simpliﬁed to
Et[ˆ zt+1]=( 1− α) ˜ Etˆ zt+1 (10)
where ˜ E stands for the expectation operator conditional on the regime staying same.
On the other hand Vt will be a quadratic function of the state variables, namely ϕ1,t,
ϕ2,t and the exogenous processes ut,r n
t a tt h er e g i m es t a r t i n ga tt i m et.11 However, at
the beginning of a new regime the Lagrange multipliers will be set to zero, indicating
the disregard of past commitments. Therefore, the value function will only depend
on the exogenous processes ut and ˆ rn
t . Accordingly, Lagrangian of the central bank
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+ϕ1,t+1(ˆ πt−κˆ xt−β(1 − α)ˆ πt+1−ut)+ϕ2,t+1(ˆ xt+σ
−1 [ˆ ıt − ˆ πt+1 − ˆ r
n
t ]−(1 − α)ˆ xt+1)
i)
.
First order necessary conditions with respect to πt,x t and it are
ˆ πt + ϕ1,t+1 − ϕ1,t
1 − α
1 − αo − (βσ
−1)ϕ1,t =0 (11)




λiˆ ıt + ϕ2,t+1 =0 , (13)
11See Ljungquist and Sargent (2000), Chapter 4.
12at each date t ≥ 0, within the regime starting at time 0. In addition, initial conditions
ϕ2,0 = ϕ1,0 =0has to be added, reﬂecting the fact that at the period of optimization,
the monetary authority is not bound by past promises. One has to note that these
ﬁrst order conditions deﬁne the optimal behavior of the policymaker at any regime:
once a reoptimization takes place at time t, it will lead to exactly the same policy
as the previous ones, given the initial conditions ϕ2,t = ϕ1,t =0 .12 In that sense,
ﬁrst order conditions represent the optimal policy behavior inside any commitment
regime.
Moreover, since the problem is linear quadratic, ﬁrst order conditions (11), (12),
(13) and the constraints (4) and (3) together with the initial conditions are suﬃcient
to determine the optimal plan. Using (13) to substitute for the interest rate, the











where ˆ zt ≡ [ˆ πt, ˆ xt´ ], ϕt =[ ϕ1,t,ϕ 2,t´ ],ξ t =[ ut, ˆ rn
t ] and H and G are matrices whose
elements involve structural parameters. This system has a unique bounded solution
if and only if H has exactly two eigenvalues outside the unit circle. It turns out that
the system satisﬁes this condition, in which case the solution for the endogenous
variables can be expressed as
qt = Aϕt +
∞ X
j=0
BjEtξt+j = Aϕt + B0ξt, (15)
verifying the guessed solution (9).
Theoretical interest rate rule under imperfect commitment. Following
Woodford and Giannoni (2003), it is possible to rearrange the ﬁrst order conditions
to obtain an instrument rule for the interest rates. From (12) and (13) one can
solve the Lagrange multipliers as functions of xt, it and it−1. Using these expressions
to substitute out the Lagrange multipliers in (11), one can obtain a linear relation
12It may appear that the conditions (11), (12), and (13) reﬂect the once-and-for-all solution to the
optimization problem as in the full commitment case. However in this set up, monetary authority
optimizes more than once, leading to a completely diﬀerent equilibrium than the equilibrium
characterized by solving (11), (12), and (13) together with (4) and (3).
13among the variables πt,x t, it,i t−1 and it−2, which can also be expressed as an
instrument rule of the form13
it = ¯ δ +¯ η1it−1 − ¯ η2it−2 + φππt + φxxt − (1 − α)φxxt−1, (16)
with initial conditions of








As explained above, (16) and (17) represent behavior of the central bank within
a speciﬁc commitment regime. In other words, (16) is the average instrument rule
inside any regime (starting at time 0 here, without loss of generality), conditional on
the regime staying the same forever. However, overall behavior of the central bank
will be diﬀerent since there will be reoptimizations with an average frequency of α.
This exactly amounts to incorporating the ﬁnite commitment eﬀect.14 Accordingly,
one can characterize the overall behavior of the instrument rule by summing over
regime shocks, i.e., by taking into account that there will be a reoptimization with
probability αo each period. The instrument rule averaged over regime shocks will
be given by
it = δ +( 1− α)ρ1it−1 − (1 − α)
2ρ2it−2 + φππt + φxxt − (1 − α)φxxt−1, (18)
where







Here, α reﬂects the overall degree of commitment. Imperfections in the commit-
ment process can be decomposed into two sources. Recall that α = αo + µ where
αo reﬂects the ﬁnite duration of the commitment regime (or ability of the central
bank), and a non-zero µ represents imperfect credibility of intentions. Suppose, for
example, that αo = .2 and µ = .3. In this case, the central bank contemplates an
average regime duration of 5 quarters ( 1
αo), while the private sector expects on av-
erage the commitment to end every 2 quarters ( 1
αo+µ = 1
α). Now, two commitment
13Had the optimality conditions not involved the contemporenous interest rate, then they would
have been called targeting rules as deﬁned by Giannoni and Woodford (2003).
14Recall that imperfect credibility eﬀect is already embedded in (16).
14is imperfect because of two reasons: First, commitment is ﬁnite (lasts 5 quarters on
average) because of limited ability of the bank, i.e., the central bank does reoptimize
every ﬁve quarters on average. Moreover, there is a credibility gap (µ)c a u s i n gt h e
policy response to deliver less inertial policy rates than it would have been under
full credibility.
If both of the parameters are zero, then α is equal to zero, i.e., central bank
can commit for an inﬁnite number of periods and the private sector expects the
current commitment to last forever. Not surprisingly, in this case instrument rule
(18) replicates the rule under inﬁnite-lasting commitment with perfect credibility.
On the other hand, when αo is equal to one and µ =0 , i.e., if the central bank
optimizes each period so that credibility is irrelevant, policy instrument only reacts
to current levels of inﬂation and the output gap, involving no intrinsic inertia. This
corresponds exactly to full discretion. For the values in between, (18) reﬂects the
average behavior of the policy instrument under varying degrees of “eﬃciency”.15
Accordingly, the term 1 − α can be named as “proximity to commitment”, “degree
of commitment”, or “degree of dynamic eﬃciency”. As a consequence, 1 − α may
yield a reasonable metric to rank past monetary policy from the perspective of how
eﬃciently gains from commitment are accrued by the central bank.
3.4 Empirical Rule versus Theoretical Rule: A Comparison
Under Imperfect Commitment
The theoretical instrument rule (1) derived under full commitment and perfect cred-
ibility involves much higher inertia than empirically observed ones. A natural ques-
tion to ask at this point is:Can the concept of imperfect commitment of the kind
introduced here reconcile this discrepancy? Or, to what extent the observed lack of
super-inertia can be justiﬁed by the imperfect commitment behavior?
Parameters of the instrument rule (18) under imperfect commitment already
suggest an interesting result: for any α ∈ (0,1), (18) will imply less inertial interest
rate path than the rule with full commitment under perfect credibility. This can be
seen simply by noting that the largest root of the lag polynomial (1−ρ1z−1+ρ2z−2)
15We deﬁne the optimal policy rule under full commitment as the most dynamically eﬃcient
rule.
15is greater than the largest root of the polynomial (1−ρ1(1−α)z−1+ρ2(1−α)2z−2).
The former is a measure of the inertia under full-commitment rule, while the latter
reﬂects the inertia of the rule under imperfect commitment. It is straightforward to
show that the ratio of the latter to the former is (1 − α), i.e., the degree of inertia
is monotonically decreasing in α. This also implies that, given any speciﬁc couple of
theoretical and empirical interest rates, there exists a level of commitment (equiv-
alently some level of α) that reconciles theory with evidence. More importantly,
this result does not depend on any speciﬁc calibration of the model, or any of the
estimated coeﬃcients.
What is the range of α that implies a super-inertial rule? This can be answered
directly by examining the largest root of the lag polynomial involving the interest
rate in (18). Using the calibration in Woodford (2003), we ﬁnd that for α<. 32, (18)
exhibits a super-inertial behavior on the part of the instrument. Note that this result
is independent of the policy parameters λx and λi but depends on the calibrated
ratio κ
σ. Therefore, for robustness concerns, the same exercise is carried among a
range of κ
σ in Table 1. For a wide range of κ
σ,t h el o w e s tα that does not deliver a
super inertial behavior varies between .2 and .4. Moreover for every plausible κ
σ, it
is possible to ﬁnd some degree of commitment under which the policy instrument
does not exhibit super-inertial behavior. On the other hand, (18) reveals that under
imperfect commitment, interest rate responds more to current output gap than past
output gap–qualitatively similar to the estimated historical policy rules.
How much imperfection–whether it originates from ﬁnite duration or lack of
credibility of intention–has to be introduced into a forward looking model, to deliver
an optimal policy behavior that mimics the historically estimated rules? One can
make a better quantitative judgement by constructing a table of coeﬃcients for a
range of α’s. Table 2 tabulates the coeﬃcients of the optimal rule under varying
degrees of commitment. For some range of α’s (between .4 and .5), theoretical rules
and estimated rules look surprisingly close. Therefore, imperfect commitment of the
kind that is analyzed here may be helpful in reconciling the theoretical policy rules
with the empirically observed behavior of the policy makers.
It is important to remind at this point that we do not provide any explanation
16a b o u tw h yi m p e r f e c tc o m m i t m e n tm a yo c c u r , 16 since the existence of a ﬁnite lasting
commitment along with some degree of lack of credibility is exogenously given. Nor,
we claim that the mechanism introduced in this study is the only way to model
inertia in the interest rates. What is crucial here is to realize that if monetary
authorities are assumed to operate under imperfect commitment, implied theoretical
instrument rules–even under the purely forward looking model considered here–
may be largely consistent with observed instrument rules.
4 Federal Reserve Bank and the Dynamic Eﬃ-
ciency of Instrument Rules
The shift in US monetary policy after the 80’s is a widely documented evidence
among the scholars of monetary policy. Several authors have already reported this
ﬁnding by either directly estimating Taylor type rules, or by counter-factual model
exercises .17 Nevertheless, these studies generally use a reduced form instrument rule,
or a mechanic reaction function to represent the systematic component of monetary
policy, and thus, do not reveal much information about the possible behavioral
sources of changes. On the contrary, this study seeks to add another dimension by
explaining the documented changes in the instrument rules by a behavioral change–
namely, shift towards commitment.
Therefore, the goal is to derive a measure of the behavioral shift in the Fed
policy from the perspective of eﬃciency in exploiting the gains from commitment.
Indeed, our characterization of imperfect commitment in the previous section already
suggests a method to measure the overall stance of monetary policy, in terms of how
close it appears to the full commitment regime: recall that the parameter α reﬂects
the overall imperfections in the commitment process. Thus, the model suggests
that once the parameter α is identiﬁed and estimated it can be used to construct a
16Or, we do not seek to explain why–with the common terminology–a perfect commitment
technology may not be available.
17For the evidence using Taylor type reaction functions, see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000),
and Judd and Rudebush (1998). For a fully speciﬁed counter-factual model exercise, see Giannoni
and Bovin (2003).
17measure for proximity to commitment.
4.1 Speciﬁcation
Recall that the theoretical interest rate rule is given by

































since π∗ = κ
1−βx∗.
An empirical counterpart of the instrument rule would be
it = c + η1it−1 + η2it−2 + φππt + φ1xxt + φ2xxt−1 +  t, (22)
where  t can be interpreted as money demand shocks. It is clear that coeﬃcients
of the reduced form instrument rule are combinations of the structural parameters
α,β,σ,κ, relative weights λx and λi, the target values π∗,x ∗,i ∗,a n dt h ed e g r e eo f
commitment, (1 − α). An empirically observed change in the instrument rule may
result from a change in any of these parameters. Direct estimation of the reduced
form instrument rule (22) will not reveal much information about the behavioral
shifts in the conduct of monetary policy across regimes. It is rather necessary to
identify the “deep” parameters in order to assess the sources of changes in policy
behavior.
Indeed, there are studies in the literature estimating the preference parameters
(λx and λi) from interest rate rules.18 However, there is no reported attempt on
extracting information about the commitment behavior of the central bank. Our
setup provides a simple way to ﬁll this gap, since the degree of deviation from
the perfect commitment behavior, α, appears directly in the instrument rule (20)
18See Lippi, 1999 Ch.8, Cecchetti, McDonnel and Perez-Quiros, 1999, Favero and Rovelli (2002),
and Özlale (2002) among others.
18along with other structural parameters. Once α is identiﬁed, it is straightforward
to rank policy rules across regimes in terms of proximity to full commitment, since,
according to our setup, the lower is α, the closer is the policy to full commitment.
It is clear that not all the structural parameters can be identiﬁed by estimating
(20). One way to solve this problem is to borrow calibrated values of some of the
parameters from other studies that use a similar model, and estimate the rest. The
parameters β, σ,a n dκ have been already calibrated in the literature by using the
structural equations (4) and (3). In what follows, we will adopt the calibrated values




and maintain the assumption that these parameters do not depend on policy.19
On the other hand, relative weights on output gap and interest rate variability,
λx and λi will be allowed to change across diﬀerent tenures. We believe that this is
plausible, since these parameters reﬂect the policy preferences and may vary with
the changes in the composition of the Federal Open Market Committee, especially
with changes in the Fed Chairmanship. Therefore, calibrated values of λx and λi
used to determine the theoretical rule in the previous section, will not be used for
the empirical exercise; instead they will be identiﬁed directly from the structural
instrument rule. Doing so will provide the estimates of chairmen-speciﬁc policy
preferences–an extra by-product of the analysis.20 Therefore, it will be possible to
contrast across regimes the policy preferences as well as the degree of commitment,
(1 − α).
As it is clear from equations (20) and (21), the target variables π∗ and i∗ cannot
be identiﬁed simultaneously. For two terms are embedded in the constant term c,
a n dt h u sc a n n o tb ep i n n e dd o w ns e p a r a t e l y . 21 Of course, one can assume a speciﬁc
19Note that β,σ and κ are deep parameters originating from individual behavior of agents. Since
they are determined by micro foundations, it is reasonable to argue that these parameters should
stay constant across diﬀerent policy regimes – a property necessary to be immune to the Lucas
(1976) critique.
20Note that the values of λx and λi do not aﬀect the inertia of the policy instrument but they
matter for the response of monetary policy to inﬂation and the output gap.
21Note that x∗ and ¯ r can be identiﬁed once the values of π∗,i ∗ are determined.
19value for the inﬂation target; then through the estimates of the other parameters,
it is possible to obtain an estimate of the funds rate target. Conversely, assuming
as p e c i ﬁc funds rate target, one can pin down inﬂation target. However, given the
uncertainty in choosing the values for i∗ and π∗, we will not put much emphasis on
target rates, yet treat the parameter δ as an independent constant. Moreover, since
α does not enter the intercept, the constant term adds no additional information
about the policy behavior (of the type we analyze here)
Consequently, equation (20) will be used to identify the degree of dynamic eﬃ-
ciency of the policy rule, (1 − α), as well as the policy preferences λx, λi.
4.2 Estimation
4.2.1 Some Structural Issues
Deﬁning the ideal (most eﬃcient) policy making as full commitment under perfect
credibility, we explore, how close to ideal was the policy conducted during the tenures
of diﬀerent Fed chairmen. Our main hypothesis is that the documented changes in
the behavior of the monetary policy instrument in the US after 1980’s can be largely
reconciled with a shift towards full commitment behavior.22 In order to conduct this
test, we simply estimate the parameters α, λx, and λi for the terms of three Fed
chairmen, using the structural speciﬁcation of the instrument rule. The value 1−α
is of particular interest, since it reﬂects the performance of the policy according to
the criterion we propose.
The parameters of interest can be directly pinned down by simply estimating
equation (20) using nonlinear least squares. However, the theoretical model imposes
some complications. Note that the output gap, inﬂation and the interest rates are
determined simultaneously: instrument reacts to the contemporaneous values of the
endogenous variables but also aﬀects them. It is possible to solve this problem by
using a delayed eﬀect version of the structural model, as proposed by Giannoni and
Woodford (2003), where the inﬂation and output gap are determined one period
in advance. In this case, the policy rule stays exactly the same, except that we
22Note that, according to the model, this shift can be either due to increased credibility or
increased ability of the Fed.
20can use the nonlinear least squares estimation using the contemporaneous values of
the variables, since shocks to the policy are not correlated with the right hand side
variables due to the delayed eﬀect.23 In what follows we will simply refer to Giannoni
and Woodford and estimate (20) using the method of nonlinear least squares.
4.2.2 Results
In the remainder of this section we present the estimates of the structural instrument
rule. We document the role of the policy preferences and the proximity to full
commitment for the policy reaction function. First we estimate the parameters of
interest for each chairmen using nonlinear least squares, and then, construct various
stability tests across periods.
Our estimates use quarterly time series, spanning the period 1970:3-2001:4, i.e.,
mostly the term of three chairmen: Burns,Volcker and Greenspan.24 All the data
were drawn from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luis database (FRED). We use average
federal funds rate in the ﬁrst month of each quarter, expressed in annual rates, as the
interest rate variable. Our inﬂation variable is annualized rate of change of the GDP
deﬂator between two subsequent quarters. Our “output gap” series is constructed
as the deviation of the logarithm of GDP from a ﬁtted quadratic function of time.25
Table 3 reports the nonlinear least squares estimation of the coeﬃcients α, λx
and, λi for the tenure of three Fed Chairmen. Recall that overall eﬃciency of
policy is measured by (1 − α). Namely, we consider the ideal policy making as
α =0 , i.e., when the monetary authority operates under full commitment with
perfect credibility, while α =1corresponds to period by period optimization or zero
credibility.
One noteworthy feature of the estimations is that (post 1982) Volcker and Greenspan
23See Giannoni and Woodford (2003) for a detailed exposition. These authors also consider a
more general case than that is mentioned here.
24We skip the Miller period since it is not long enough to test the rule. The terms are 1970:3-
1978:2 f or Burns, 1979:3- 1987:2 f or Volcke r and 1987:3- 2003:4 f or Greenspan. Howeve r, since t he
operating instrument was borrowed reserves during 1979:3-1982:3, we prefer to discard this period
from the estimations.
25We also repeated the estimations based on CPI and CBO output gap. The results did not
change much, hence we do not report them here.
21periods involve a similar degree of eﬃciency (0.47 and 0.49), while the monetary pol-
icy in Burns period seems to have been conducted under a less eﬃcient way (with a
degree of 0.29). In other words, these results point out that Volcker and Greenspan
pursued a policy that is closer to the ideal case of full commitment than the policy
in the 70’s. These ﬁndings suggest that there has been an improvement either in
policy ability or in policy credibility after 1980’s. Whether the change originates
from favorable natural factors or from improvement of Fed’s credible track, the con-
clusion is the same: Fed’s implied instrument rule suggests a more eﬃcient rule after
80’s compared to 70’s.
The bottom panel of Table 3 tabulates several stability tests across periods. It is
clear that the hypothesis that α is equal in Volcker and Greenspan periods cannot
be rejected. On the other hand, monetary policy under Burns period seems to
have been conducted under a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent style than post 1980’s chairmen.
Therefore, recent approach of analyzing the monetary policy under two diﬀerent
eras–before and after Volcker–seems to be appropriate.
Moreover, the estimated policy preferences are very similar in Volcker and Greenspan
periods. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that, during former’s term, pol-
icy maker’s objective was pure inﬂation targeting, while we can reject it during the
latter’s term. This result is remarkable, since it suggests that although the policy
preferences seem to be diﬀerent, the regimes were similar in terms of dynamic eﬃ-
ciency. In other words, the policy was conducted in a relatively eﬃcient way in both
periods, exploiting the forward looking expectations in such a way that the central
bank faces an improved output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ compared to Burns’ period.
One other noteworthy feature of the estimations is the sizeable change in the
magnitude of the weight on interest rate stabilization after 1980’s. Nevertheless,
this result should not be strongly emphasized since the stability tests cannot be
rejected for this parameter.
5 Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of this study has been twofold. First, we attempted to reconcile the
theoretical rule implied by a purely forward looking model with the historically
22estimated Taylor-like rules. Second we aimed to construct and estimate a measure
of monetary policy on the grounds of dynamic eﬃciency–namely proximity to a
full commitment regime.
To achieve these goals, ﬁrst, the concept of imperfect commitment is introduced
into the standard optimal monetary policy problem of recent forward looking models.
A theoretical rule that nests discretion and commitment as special cases, is used to
identify the dynamic eﬃciency of the commitment policy. It is shown that the
notion of imperfect commitment, by and large, explains the discrepancy between
theory and evidence. In particular, it is possible to obtain non super inertial rules
by using the appropriate degree of dynamic eﬃciency–a feature that theoretical
rule under full commitment have not delivered.
Second, we estimate the preference parameters of the monetary authority and
the proximity to full commitment, directly from the structural policy rule for three
diﬀerent Fed Chairmen. Empirical results suggest that late Volcker and Greenspan
periods were conducted under a similar philosophy, in the sense that, both periods
reveal a similar degree of eﬃciency, exploiting the forward looking expectations in
such a way to achieve a more favorable trade-oﬀ between target variables. On the
other hand, monetary policy under the tenure of Burns was relatively less eﬃcient.
Finally, recall that the deﬁnition of proximity to commitment was derived under
two assumptions, that is, commitment regimes are ﬁnite, and the private sector
expects the commitment to end, on average, sooner than originally intended by the
central bank. Stretching our imagination, these assumptions can be combined under
two related deﬁnitions of credibility, namely, credibility of ability and credibility of
intention. Therefore, our analysis implicitly proposes a method to measure the
overall credibility of the monetary authority, and the empirical ﬁndings conﬁrm
that the Fed’s credibility has improved after 1980’s.
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Table 2: Comparison of Estimated Rules with Theoretical Rules under Imperfect 
Commitment. 
 
    
    it-1  it-2  πt  x t x  t-1 
ESTIMATED  1.16 -0.43 0.42 0.30 -0.03 
α=0  2.16 -1.01 0.64 0.33 -0.33 
α=.1  1.94 -0.82 0.64 0.33 -0.30 
α=.2  1.73 -0.65 0.64 0.33 -0.26 
α=.3  1.51 -0.49 0.64 0.33 -0.23 
α=.4  1.30 -0.36 0.64 0.33 -0.20 
α=.5  1.08 -0.25 0.64 0.33 -0.17 
α=.6  0.86 -0.16 0.64 0.33 -0.13 
α=.7  0.65 -0.09 0.64 0.33 -0.10 
α=.8  0.43 -0.04 0.64 0.33 -0.07 
























     




























    
Structural Change p-values 
Greenspan-Volcker  0.43 0.88 0.86 
Greenspan-Burns <0.01  0.87  0.32 




Note : Samples are Greenspan 1987:3-2003:4, Volcker: 1982:3-1987:2, Burns: 1970:3-1978:2 
 
 
 
 
 
 